AM Edition: Top 10 Politics Articles on LiveNews.co.nz for May 27, 2026 – Full Text

Source: New Zealand Government

The Government is moving to protect some of New Zealand’s most iconic songs for longer, with changes to the Copyright Act that will back Kiwi artists and bring New Zealand into line with international standards.

Arts, Culture and Heritage Minister Paul Goldsmith and Commerce and Consumer Affairs Minister Cameron Brewer say the changes will extend copyright protection for most works by 20 years.

“Songs like I See Red, April Sun in Cuba, and Gutter Black are part of New Zealand’s soundtrack. They are played in our homes, at our parties, on our radios, and across the world,” Mr Brewer says.

“These recordings are not just nostalgic classics. They are the work of New Zealand artists who created something lasting, and they deserve to keep earning from that work.”

“This is why we have agreed to prioritise these changes during New Zealand Music Month, when we celebrate the creativity, talent, and contribution of our artists and wider music industry, Mr Goldsmith says

“This is something that’s been raised with us by the music industry for a long time. I’m pleased that we’re getting on with it.

“These protections ensure New Zealand artists can continue to benefit from their hard work.

“Our Government’s vision is for New Zealand to be as well known for its arts and creativity as it is for dairy exports and beautiful scenery. One of our key actions is modernising regulation to enable the cultural sectors to thrive, and this is a great example.”

The changes will extend copyright protection for music recordings from 50 years to 70 years after publication. Other types of works will be protected for 70 years after the creator’s death.

“New Zealand has been out of step for too long,” Mr Brewer says.

“Some of our best-known recordings from the 1970s are close to falling out of copyright. That means artists risk losing control over their work and the ability to be paid for it. That is not fair, and we are fixing it.” 

“But this is not only about protecting the classics. It is also about backing today’s Kiwi artists and the next generation of musicians, who deserve to know the work they are creating now will be protected into the future.” Mr Brewer says

These changes were agreed to as part of the free trade agreements with the UK and EU and must be in place by 1 May 2028.

“Further changes to the Copyright Act will be announced in the next few weeks.” Mr Brewer says.

Original source: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/05/26/keeping-kiwi-music-in-kiwi-hands/

Source: Green Party

Today’s report from Lawyers for Climate Action shows that Luxon’s handouts to fossil fuel companies likely breach New Zealand’s trade agreement with the United Kingdom, undermining our international reputation and trade relationships.

“A business wouldn’t get away with the spin and breaches of agreement Luxon’s Government does,” says Green Party Co-leader Chlöe Swarbrick. 

“The findings that this Government’s subsidisation of fossil fuel corporations likely breaches our UK Free Trade Agreement and undermine our EU FTA build on Green-commissioned independent, expert legal advice that the Government’s fossil fuel subsidies also breach the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability.”

“The National Party tell us they’re good economic managers then tank the economy; they tell us they’re committed to our climate commitments then breach those commitments.”

“Unfortunately, this Government seems intent on doing damage to our country and reputation that will outlast their one term. Here they have an opportunity to face up to their wrongdoing and fix the situation by reversing these oil and gas handouts.”

“But just on Monday, the Prime Minister’s Office tried to brush off proof that it had kept secret – intentionally or otherwise – backroom lobbying by major polluters securing a law change in their favour.”

“Every day, we get more evidence of who Luxon’s Government works for. It’s not regular people struggling to make ends meet. It’s the very corporations driving the cost of greed crisis,” says Swarbrick. 

Original source: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/05/26/luxons-government-found-breaching-trade-agreements-again/

Source: New Zealand Government

Two new culverts have now been completed on State Highway 3 (SH3) north of New Plymouth, as part of the Government’s priority bridge replacement programme, helping to improve the resilience of this critical lifeline, Transport Minister Chris Bishop says.

“Building better resilience into our infrastructure is a priority for the Government. SH3 is a critical lifeline for freight, tourism, and all communities living alongside it, and I’m pleased to see work to replace and upgrade these two culverts completed,” Mr Bishop says.

“We’ve seen in recent weeks how crucial SH3 is to road users, particularly the impacts of weather events through Awakino Gorge. While these culverts are further south of the gorge, replacing them before they fail is important for future proofing the route.

“Water, and keeping it away from our roads, is one of the greatest challenges facing the resilience of our roading network. We need to make sure all new culverts and bridges are designed with the future in mind. They need to better be able to handle water flow and divert it appropriately away from our roads.

“The ageing Mangapepeke No. 1 and Mangapepeke No. 2 culverts were part of the government’s priority bridge replacement programme and work to replace them was delivered at the same time. These new culverts measure 21 and 30 metres in length, while one is 3 by 3 metres and the other is 4 metres in diameter. These new culverts both have a lifespan of 100 years.

“The work to repair or upgrade nine priority bridges and culverts was given the green light in July 2024 as part of the 2024-27 National Land Transport Programme (NLTP). Since then, a further five priority locations have been added, and NZTA is progressing design, consenting, and contracting so work can start.

“Fixing the basics of our roading network is a priority for this Government, and with many bridges across the country requiring speed and weight restrictions due to their age and condition, it is essential priority bridges are replaced when funding is available with more modern and resilient structures.

“Our state highways are critical routes for freight and tourism and serve as important lifelines for communities around New Zealand. We expect our state highway bridges to be well maintained and properly managed, which is why this replacement and maintenance work is so important.

“Further inland, on the State Highway 43 Forgotten World Highway, near Taumarunui, work is almost complete on the Kururau Stream Water Drive bridge replacement. The previous structure is a hand dug culvert, which is about 80 years old, and has suffered natural erosion over time. The new modern 20-metre bridge bypasses the old structure with an improved road alignment.

“The new bridge is a more resilient solution and ensures SH43 will remain safe and reliable for years to come.The majority of the bridge’s construction has been carried out away from the existing road, meaning there’s been minimal impact to road users. Final work on this bridge is expected to be complete mid-June.

“I want to thank local communities for their patience and understanding as these works have been carried out and the crews working on the projects.”

Notes to editor:

Bridges/culverts set to be replaced in the 2024-27 NLTP period:

• SH3 Mangapepeke No. 1 Culvert, Taranaki (new addition for 2024-27 period)
• SH3 Mangapepeke No. 2 Culvert, Taranaki
• SH43 Kururau Stream Water Drive, Whanganui
• SH25 Pepe Stream Bridge, Coromandel
• SH82 Elephant Hill Bridge, South Canterbury
• SH82 Waihao North Bridge, South Canterbury
• SH6 Coal Creek Overbridge, West Coast
• SH25 Ramarama Stream Bridge, Waikato
• SH27 Ohinekaua Bridge, Waikato 
• SH36 Hauraki Stream Culvert, Bay of Plenty

Bridge maintenance renewal works:

• SH25 Boundary Creek Bridge, Coromandel (new addition for 2024-27 period)
• SH35 Mangahauini No. 1 Bridge, Gisborne (new addition for 2024-27 period)
• SH38 Frasertown Bridge, Hawke’s Bay (new addition for 2024-27 period)
• SH50 Ngaruroro River Bridge, Hawke’s Bay (new addition for 2024-27 period)

Other announcements recently made:

• SH2 Pekatahi Bridge, Bay of Plenty. Design and pre-implementation work for a two-lane replacement is underway. Construction is expected to be within the 2027-30 NLTP once funding is approved and a contractor is appointed.

This programme excludes bridges being replaced due to weather event damage.

Original source: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/05/26/sh3-mangapepeke-culvert-replacements-now-complete/

Source: New Zealand Government

New Zealanders will benefit from new rules announced by the Electricity Authority to create a level playing field in the electricity market, preventing the country’s four biggest electricity generators from using their market power to squeeze out smaller competitors, Energy Minister Simeon Brown says.

“Creating a level playing field in the electricity market plays an important role in this Government’s focus on delivering secure, affordable energy for every household and business,” Mr Brown says.

“From 1 July this year, the four big gentailers, Contact, Genesis, Mercury, and Meridian, will no longer be allowed to give their own retail arms a better deal than independent retailers when it comes to managing wholesale electricity price risk.

“This means smaller retailers can compete on fair terms, which is good news for every Kiwi household and business looking for a better deal on their power bill.”

Around the morning and dinner-time peak, when households increase their power consumption, wholesale electricity prices spike. Small retailers rely on hedge contracts with the big gentailers to manage that risk so they can offer competitive prices to their customers. Until now, the gentailers have been able to favour their own retail arms over the competition.

The new rules will require gentailers to:

• Treat competing retailers the same way they treat their own retail arms when supplying hedge contracts, unless there is an objective reason not to
• Submit annual plans to the Electricity Authority showing how they will comply, and certify they are doing so
• Demonstrate every six months that their retail prices reflect the actual expected cost of electricity, so an equally efficient competitor can compete with them.

Subject to legislation passing, penalties for serious breaches will rise from a maximum of $2 million to up to $10 million, three times the commercial gain, or 10 per cent of a company’s turnover, whichever is greatest. The higher penalties are due to be in place in 2027.

“A level playing field will encourage more competition, more investment and more innovation in the electricity sector. That means better prices and more choice for Kiwis.

“This Government wants every home and business in New Zealand to have access to secure, affordable energy.”

Today’s announcement builds on a wide range of Government actions to fix the basics and build a more secure, affordable energy future for Kiwis, including:

• Fast-track consenting rules to encourage energy infrastructure construction, with four renewable energy projects already fast-tracked
• Supporting commercially rational capital funding requests by Genesis, Mercury and Meridian to improve energy security
• Undertaking a procurement process for an LNG facility to keep the power on when hydro lakes are low, and there is insufficient solar and wind power to meet demand
• Winter Energy Payments to superannuitants and recipients of main benefits
• Short and medium-term actions by the Energy Competition Task Force, including strengthening hedge contract trading designed to address super peak demand periods 
• Actively seeking to improve the performance of electricity distribution – which comprises around a quarter of Kiwis’ power bills
• Removing the need for building consents to install rooftop solar on existing homes and buildings, with solar connections up 16 per cent in the past year
• Developing new rules to ensure fairer rates for consumers putting power back into the grid from their solar generation at peak times. 

“Today’s announcement will ensure a fairer, more competitive electricity market, so all New Zealanders can benefit from secure, affordable energy when they need it.”

Original source: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/05/26/delivering-a-fairer-electricity-market-for-kiwi-consumers/

MIL OSI

MIL OSI

Source: New Zealand Government

Associate Transport Minister James Meager has confirmed two new appointments to the board of Maritime New Zealand, including a new Chair and Deputy Chair.

Kevin Short has been elevated to the Chair’s role, starting from 1 July 2026. He has held the Deputy Chair role since April 2025.

“Mr Short has already made a strong contribution to the Board and developed a thorough understanding of Maritime NZ’s role, functions and strategic direction. I’m confident he will bring the experience, judgement and continuity needed as Chair,” Mr Meager says.

Charles Finny and Belinda Clark will join as new members in late May and June respectively. Mr Finny has been appointed Deputy Chair from 1 July 2026. 

“Mr Finny is an experienced governor with strong board and public-sector experience as well as a deep understanding of regulatory and maritime settings. He also has trade and export expertise through his advisory work and has developed strong connections with port chief executives,” Mr Meager says.

“I also welcome the valuable expertise that Ms Clark brings from her governance roles on other boards and previous Chief Executive roles. She has extensive capability in organisational and delivery governance, including audit and risk management through former leadership roles for major public-sector agencies in New Zealand and Australia. 

“I’d also like to acknowledge the work and commitment of Dame Jo Brosnahan who has served as Chair since December 2018 and led the Board through a challenging period of significant disruption and change.

“With her term concluding on 30 June 2026, I thank Dame Jo for her years of devoted service, and I wish her well for her future endeavours.”

Original source: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/05/26/maritime-nz-board-appointees-confirmed/

Source: Privacy Commissioner

27 May 2026, 05:00

Download a copy of the Executive summary: Inquiry into the cyber security breach affecting the Manage My Health Limited patient portal (opens to PDF, 484KB)

The breach and this inquiry 

On 1 January 2026, Manage My Health Limited (“MMH”) notified the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (“OPC”) that threat actors (“hackers”) had managed to steal large amounts of health information from MMH’s patient health portal.  Subsequent investigations found that valid stolen patient credentials had been used by the hackers to enter the portal. Those credentials were then used to access and copy documents from thousands of other patients’ accounts. 

Information in the MMH portals is stored in various separate sections. Only one of those sections was compromised (the “My Health Documents” module), but 99,416 patients were affected (revised down from the initial estimates of 126,000). This makes it one of New Zealand’s largest known breaches of sensitive personal information, and it has caused serious distress to many affected patients. 

Around 91% of affected patients appear to have been in Northland. This was the result of a unique agreement between the Northland District Health Board (now Health New Zealand) and MMH to make certain types of Northland hospital records available to patients through the MMH portal. This project started in around 2019, was piloted in 2021 and was more widely rolled out between 2023 and 2025. 

Given the seriousness and the scale of the breach, the Privacy Commissioner publicly announced an inquiry on 21 January 2026 and issued terms of reference on 27 January 2026. The inquiry is being conducted under section 17(1)(i) of the Privacy Act 2020. The inquiry is in two phases. 

This report covers Phase 1. It looks at whether MMH and Health New Zealand (“Health NZ”) had adequate security safeguards in place to protect health information in the patient portal, as required by Rule 5 of the Health Information Privacy Code 2020 (“the Code”). It also comments on the security safeguards that general practices are expected to have in place when they engage health portal providers to communicate with their patients. 

The value of patient health portals 

The Ministry of Health has long recognised the value of patient health portals as part of its digital health strategy. As reflected in the 2017/2018 report by the Office of the Auditor General (opens to PDF, 322KB), the Ministry has actively encouraged the take-up of patient portals in the health sector. Health portals have also had the support of general practitioner organisations including The Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners (opens to PDF, 636KB), as they are a practical and efficient way to provide patient services and information. 

This inquiry is not a signal that OPC is opposed to patient portals. On the contrary, done well, we consider that these tools can enhance privacy by providing better access for patients to their own information and better control over that information. They can also improve efficiency in the health sector. 

However, to achieve those benefits, it is essential that patient health portals are secure, and that patients can trust them to operate in a privacy-protective way. 

Overall findings

Our inquiry has concluded that both MMH and Health NZ failed in their responsibilities to have reasonable security safeguards in place and therefore that they breached Rule 5 of the Code.

Findings about Manage My Health

MMH’s entire business focuses on handling and storing sensitive health information in a secure and trustworthy way. As a result, while it is a small company, Rule 5 of the Code still requires it to have very strong technical and operational security safeguards in place.

We have concluded that this security breach was not the result of a single failure. Instead, it involved a combination of factors. If those safeguards had been operating more effectively at the time of the incident, it would have been less likely that the breach would occur at all, and the impact would have been reduced.

In particular:

• Multifactor authentication was available within the platform but was not required for all users. It was only an optional feature.
• Web security controls were in place but were not sufficiently effective.
• Identity and access management controls were also in place but not sufficiently effective. A valid but stolen patient account was able to be used to access and extract information relating to thousands of other patients.
• Earlier testing had revealed recurring themes relating to access control and application security risks. While the precise sequence of events may not have been specifically anticipated, the themes identified by the testing were not adequately addressed at the time of the breach.
• We had concerns about whether some security testing and assurance activities were sufficiently effective to identify and mitigate the relevant risks prior to the incident.
• There were deficiencies in the company’s data leak protection settings and in its ability to detect incidents and take action to intervene. MMH’s own systems did not detect the presence and actions of the hackers: it first became aware of the problem when it was alerted by Health NZ. 
• While risk management processes existed at the time of the incident, they were not sufficient to ensure that safeguards relating to health information were working.

MMH has informed us that it has already taken steps to address these deficiencies and that the platform is secure. The steps that MMH states that it has taken include requiring multifactor authentication for all users and fixing the particular vulnerability that the hackers used. It is also taking steps to update its contracts and policies, and to boost its governance arrangements. However, we have not yet independently validated that the changes address all the issues raised by this inquiry, or that the stated controls are in place and operating effectively.

Findings about Health NZ

The decision by Health NZ in Northland to routinely send certain hospital-related documentation to patients through MMH’s health portal resulted in large amounts of sensitive information being stored in patient accounts that would not otherwise have been there. Health NZ also actively encouraged and supported patients and their GP practices to sign up to MMH so that they could receive their hospital documents. 

It is clear that Health NZ was trying to improve patient services as well as improve efficiency for the hospital. This was a novel – and potentially precedent-setting – digital project. 

The novelty and scale of the project created very strong obligations on Health NZ to ensure that patient information would be properly protected. While it did not have direct visibility of or control over MMH’s technical security settings, Health NZ needed to meet very strong standards for due diligence, contract drafting, governance, risk management and ongoing assurance.  

We have concluded that Health NZ did not always do so and that these failures amounted to a breach of Rule 5(1)(b) of the Health Information Privacy Code.

In particular:

• Health NZ did not conduct sufficient due diligence over MMH before it decided to engage the company as its design partner and supplier. The result may have been the same, since MMH was an obvious partner for the project, but decision makers would have been better informed.
• There were serious problems with the quality of the privacy risk assessments, though things improved somewhat in the later stages of the project.
• The way in which the MMH system would manage the hospital information was insufficiently understood and key technical issues were not identified.
• The Health NZ project team appear to have relied too much on the security and privacy of information provided by MMH, rather than taking a more independent view.
• While there was an active project steering group, with senior leadership, that group did not include direct privacy or security representation as would be expected for a project of this novelty, complexity and scale.
• There was also no evidence that the project team received advice from internal privacy or security specialists early enough to properly inform the design of the project (though Health NZ were unable to contact many former staff to check this).
• The contracts between Health NZ and MMH were not fit for purpose and did not contain appropriate protections for patient information.

These findings are likely to be largely historic in nature. Health NZ has informed us that a variety of changes have been made, including developing updated digital services contract templates, and making improvements to privacy and security assessment processes with the support of expert central privacy and cyber security teams. However, information from Northland hospitals is still shared with patients through their MMH accounts and Health NZ is still funding licence fees for GP practices to use MMH. 

Recommendations about general practitioners

All information in the My Health Documents module was either placed there by patients themselves, consisted of hospital records that were part of the Health NZ arrangement with MMH, or were copies of referral letters that MMH (not GP practices) had decided to store in that area of the patient portal. Put simply, MMH was not acting on behalf of GP practices when it stored any of that information in the My Health Documents module. GP practices had no control over those arrangements. Nor did GPs have access to the information stored in My Health Documents. 

 it happens, therefore, we consider that it is unlikely that GP practices were legally responsible for the security of the specific information that was stolen in this cyber security breach. 

However, in our opinion, it is largely a question of luck that the breach did not involve information for which GP practices were responsible. It is essential that GP practices are aware that they still have obligations under Rule 5 of the Code to have reasonable security safeguards in place when engaging a patient health portal service provider such as MMH. 

It is not possible for this inquiry to review what steps each individual GP practice has or has not taken. There are thousands of general practices in New Zealand, and there will be significant variability in whether they engaged MMH at all, what they contracted MMH to do, what information was stored in the portal, and what patients were told. 

Instead, we have set out our general expectations for the reasonable security safeguards that GP practices should have in place when engaging a patient health portal. Those expectations will provide a framework for assessing any future complaints about whether GP practices have complied with Rule 5. 

Two additional recommendations

At the moment, there is no central verification of whether key health sector suppliers such as patient health portals meet the relevant security standards set by the Health Information Standards Organisation (part of Health NZ). The health sector holds some of New Zealand’s most sensitive information. Security breaches impact not only the affected individuals but also trust and confidence in the health system as a whole.  Simply relying on vendor assurances about their security profile is problematic, as this inquiry shows. 

To be certain that security is adequate, GP practices or other health providers technically have to check security documentation and contracts, or engage independent advice to assess the documentation that suppliers provide. 

We consider that the status quo is unrealistic and unnecessarily burdensome. It leads to duplication, uncertainty and unnecessary expense for GP practices or other healthcare professionals, who usually do not have security or legal specialists on staff. Checking by multiple organisations as part of due diligence also increases compliance costs and engagement costs for suppliers.

Australia has approached this issue by introducing, amongst other things, a registration system for health organisations who wish to access electronic health records including organisations offering repository or portal services (the “My Health Records” Act). Whether or not the New Zealand government considers that this approach is appropriate, we consider that central government needs to do more to improve security confidence in health sector suppliers who are an increasingly important part of the system. 

This inquiry is a useful illustration of how the current provisions of the Privacy Act (particularly section 11) work. It has revealed weaknesses in the way in which the Privacy Act allocates legal responsibility for security, in situations where third party providers are involved. We consider that there is an opportunity to simplify the settings and better meet consumer and regulatory expectations. 

While the inquiry has concluded that MMH is legally responsible under Rule 5(1)(a) of the Code, this has relied on a close examination of how MMH operates. Other patient health portals – as well as other third party health services – operate differently and a security breach would not necessarily lead to the ability for OPC to take compliance action against that third party under Rule 5 of the Code. 

It should not be that complicated for the regulator, health consumers or health sector users of these services to identify which service provider or agency is accountable under the Privacy Act or its Codes. We also consider that the existing model, which relies on principal agencies making use of contractual remedies to address failures in security standards, is insufficient. 

Instead, we recommend that all agencies should have direct liability for their security settings under the Privacy Act, including when they are providing services to others.

This would simplify the process for individuals seeking to complain about a security breach. In particular, it would simplify the section 11 analysis as part of an OPC investigation (and any later Human Rights Review Tribunal examination) and therefore improve efficiency.

Also it would enable OPC to take direct compliance action against a third party provider that fails to have reasonable security safeguards in place. At the moment, OPC’s ability to bring compliance action relies on showing that the third party is using information on its own behalf or engaging directly with consumers, not merely processing information for a client organisation. 

Finally, businesses – particularly small businesses like many general practitioners – should not have to rely on contractual provisions if the third parties that they engage fail to have reasonable security settings in place. It is unduly burdensome for each business to have to take separate legal action under contract to enforce security expectations. Contracts are important, but businesses should be confident that the Privacy Act itself also requires the third party to have reasonable security settings in place.

Again, Australia has also been considering this issue. The review of the Australian Privacy Act has recommended introducing a ‘controller’ and ‘processor’ distinction (Proposal 22.1), similar to the structure of the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) in Europe. Under Article 32 of the GDPR, processors are required to have a level of security appropriate to the risk. This proposal was accepted in principle by the Australian Government. We agree that Article 32 is a useful model. 

Next steps

Both MMH and Health NZ have told us that they have already made changes to better protect patient information. However, we intend to issue compliance notices under section 123 of the Privacy Act to both MMH and Health NZ, to independently check that those steps have in fact been taken and to check that the changes fix the breaches that this inquiry has identified. It is important that patients can be more confident that their information will be properly protected from now on. 

We will also consider any complaints that affected people may make about this breach if they consider that the breach has caused them harm. 

Finally, we will start Phase 2 of our inquiry shortly and will report on our findings later in 2026. That phase will consider issues such as:

• whether patients were properly asked for authorisation before a MMH account was established for them and information was stored in that account
• whether patients received adequate information about how the portal would be used
• how information in the portal was retained and deleted: for instance when a primary health practice ceases to use MMH; when a patient moves between practices; and when an account has been inactive or the patient has died  
• the quality of communications about the breach
• whether the notifications to OPC and to affected patients met the requirements of the Privacy Act
• any aspects of these issues that are particularly relevant for Māori, especially Northland Māori
• whether any additions need to be made to the compliance notices to address other breaches of the Code. 

Original source: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/05/27/executive-summary-inquiry-into-the-cyber-security-breach-affecting-the-manage-my-health-limited-patient-portal/

Source: Media Outreach

Code4Mzansi highlights the growing strength of South Africa’s developer ecosystem and the role of youth-led innovation in shaping the country’s digital future

– Published and distributed with permission of Media-Outreach.com.

Source: Media Outreach

HONG KONG SAR – Media OutReach Newswire – 26 May 2026 – At 11.08pm on May 24, Dr Lai Ka-ying made history by becoming the first Hong Kong astronaut to blast off into space aboard the Shenzhou-23 manned spaceship. This momentous occasion also launched a new era for Hong Kong’s development of innovation and technology (I&T) as well as the city’s participation in national development under China’s 15th Five-Year Plan.

Congratulating Dr Lai on her achievement, John Lee, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), said that the HKSAR can “transform from a ‘supporter’ of the country’s great aerospace endeavours into an ‘executor’ “.

“This not only demonstrates the HKSAR’s capability in contributing to the country’s development into an aerospace power, but also showcases how Hong Kong could better integrate into and serve the overall national development,” Mr Lee said.

“This mission is of great significance, as it is not only the first manned spaceflight mission during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, but also the first time for a payload expert from the HKSAR to participate in it.”

The Shenzhou-23 crew will conduct on-orbit rotation with the Shenzhou-21 crew. The crew, including Dr Lai, will stay in the space station and conduct multiple experiments and applications in various fields such as scientific applications.

The Secretary for Innovation, Technology and Industry of the HKSAR Government, Professor Sun Dong, led a delegation to the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center to witness this historic moment. Members of the delegation included other government representatives, I&T experts, youths and students.

“I truly believe this is a great demonstration of Hong Kong integrating into and serving the overall national development through concrete actions, while contributing our strength in I&T,” Professor Sun said.

” ‘Science and technology is primary productive force, talent is primary resource, and innovation is primary driver of growth.’ The HKSAR Government will continue to drive the development of I&T, accelerate the establishment of an international I&T centre, and make greater contributions to building our nation into a strong power in science, technology, and aerospace.”

Commissioner for Innovation and Technology of the HKSAR Government, Mr Ivan Lee, said that the Government had been providing funding support for universities and research institutions in conducting aerospace technology-related projects through the Innovation and Technology Fund.

“In 2024, we launched a special call for funding applications, inviting universities to submit project proposals related to aerospace technology. Following a selection process, we supported six projects. Among them was the Multi‑Spectral Imaging Carbon Observatory (MUSICO) developed by a team from the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,” he said.

On the Tiangong Space Station, Dr Lai will conduct experiments including operating the MUSICO — the world’s first lightweight, high-resolution synergistic observatory for carbon dioxide and methane emission point sources.

Born and raised in Hong Kong, Dr Lai is a Superintendent of the Hong Kong Police Force. In the recruitment exercise of China’s fourth batch of preparatory astronauts launched in 2022, she was successfully selected as a payload expert and was deployed to the China Astronaut Research and Training Center for training.

Before embarking on the historic spaceflight, Dr Lai expressed hope that it would inspire more Hong Kong youths to devote themselves to the field of I&T, thereby contributing to the country’s scientific and technological self-reliance and strength.

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