Source: New Zealand Government
Good afternoon
We’d like to start by acknowledging distinguished guests here today – parliamentary colleagues, members of the Diplomatic Corps, Honorary advisors to the Asia New Zealand Foundation, and the outgoing, and newly appointed board of trustees for the Asia New Zealand Foundation.
It’s our pleasure to be in your company.
Let’s also acknowledge the leadership of two individuals in the audience today.
First, Dame Fran Wilde, who recently completed her term as Chair of the Asia New Zealand Foundation. As Chair of the foundation, you have worked tirelessly to enhance New Zealanders’ understanding of Asia. Thank you for your dedicated service and leadership.
We’d also like to acknowledge the leadership of His Excellency Mr. Alfredo Perez Bravo, Ambassador of Mexico and Dean of the Diplomatic Corp. Ambassador, you will be returning home soon, we wish you all the very best, and thank you for your wise counsel.
Our first major speech, at the beginning of this term, was made to the Diplomatic Corps. We described members of the Corps as critical enablers for their countries and for New Zealand.
Ambassadors and High Commissioners, you have fulfilled this role superbly well and we have tried hard to be accessible and to keep the commitments we made in that speech; to be a principled and engaged country, one determined to act with both energy and urgency.
We have listened carefully to you, and learned from all of our discussions, which we think is the essence of diplomatic engagement, so thank you all.
Foreign Policy Response to Order-shattering Geopolitics
Our speech today will address the Government’s foreign policy response to the severe geopolitical challenges New Zealand has faced since coming into office. Traversing the foreign policy reset and its execution this past two-and-a-half years, we will focus our discussion on how we have vigorously sought to advance our national interests in the toughest environment any can remember.
Given your symposium’s focus, we will also chronicle our achievements for one crucial dimension of the reset, the serious uplift in our relations with Asia and why this matters for New Zealand’s future prosperity and security.
We have travelled widely across North Asia, South East Asia and South Asia, struck by the economic dynamism of the region and its people. We have experienced everywhere we’ve visited the desire by Asian countries to do more with New Zealand, their positive view of us shaped by our long history of constructive engagement with them.
Now, the theme for your symposium, ‘Asia in Transition: The Middle Power Moment’, is a thought-provoking one.
We won’t wade into academic debates on who is, and who isn’t, a middle power, or whether it’s their moment or not. Rather, what we would say is that big or small, all countries who lack the coercive power and agency of the world’s great powers are seeking to adapt to the order-shattering nature of contemporary geopolitics.
Order-shattering it is. Not since World War II have we seen such global disruption, a world of heightened strategic competition, and one where multilateralism is being challenged by great power ambition, where rules and norms are daily shattered, and where trade protectionism is rising.
How well we adapt will define how effectively we maintain our agency and national voice through a prolonged period of global disruption.
While some leaders reach for the most vivid rhetorical framing of the current challenge, amplifying the power of their diagnosis, they fail when it comes to offering anything approaching the same acuteness or clarity about their solutions.
At best, there is recognition that in troubled times such as we face, middle power and small states need to see more of each other, talk more, and do more together to defend and promote their respective interests. In other words they describe the orthodox means and ends of diplomacy.
And if multilateralism’s vulnerabilities are most obviously located in the United Nations, particularly the Security Council – with abuse of the veto and its structural dysfunction – the UN cannot be left as an elephant in the room in either diagnosis or solution.
So, we are left with a first order dilemma for any state grappling with responding to today’s challenges. Do member states of the UN support an overhaul of the premier institution that has promoted peaceful relations since 1945, including veto reform? Or do they wish to recreate that institution from scratch?
We would suggest there is far less clarity around that answer. Creating new branches of interlocking groupings of like-minded countries, or new more expansive regional groupings has merit. It is a necessary response to present conditions and an ineffectual UN. But only by addressing the future of the UN will our collective response be sufficient to restore the rules-based order to better health.
For New Zealand, we think that only by root and branch reform of the UN – by refocusing it on its core charter – can it be made fit for purpose. An effective, reformed UN will reduce its vulnerability to the ambivalence, criticism or outright repudiation it faces today.
Whether the UN80 reform effort is sufficient for the magnitude of the challenge, we are yet to see, but we are playing our part while continuing our strong call for reform in our National Statements at the UN.
So, New Zealand is sure about both its diagnosis and response. Our diagnosis is embedded in our government’s foreign reset, made early this term. It noted three big shifts in the international order: from rules to power, from economics to security, and from efficiency to resilience.
Global conditions have deteriorated sharply since the reset, and those shifts have only accelerated in scope. Their disruptive effects have created unwelcome and complex crises, one after another, but the direction of travel has only confirmed our diagnosis.
New Zealand cannot afford to be behind history’s curve. We learned this as a country during the Covid pandemic. It should not be controversial to say that we were ahead of the curve, until we weren’t, and the costs will be with us, in both human and economic terms, for a long time because of our failure to anticipate the changing direction of the pandemic’s curve and adapt to it.
Now, it’s not easy to either anticipate or predict in today’s uncertain global environment, so New Zealand has necessarily adopted a prudent approach to our foreign policy settings. Those settings were also informed by the lethargic approach our predecessors took to foreign policy, so we began very much behind the curve, playing catch-up.
We started from the position of accepting the world as it is, not as we would wish to be. We are realists and have said so in all our speeches. We mean it.
So, how to characterize our response?
We resolved to lead a highly active diplomacy, with more energy and urgency, as the times and circumstances demanded. Staff tell me that in the two-and-a-half years since becoming Minister, we have spent fully seven-and-a-half months offshore. We’ve visited 89 countries, 54 different countries, and over the course of the term so far, we’ve had 560 foreign policy engagements.
There are a couple of serious points to make about this effort. First, it cannot and must not be a one-off. We believe that for New Zealand to have its voice heard by others, and its interests considered, future foreign ministers will need to replicate our level of activity.
In the Pacific we call it talanoa – meeting face to face – and its value is crucial for advancing or defending our interests, and not just in the Pacific. We have invested a lot in our international relationships because they are crucial for growing our prosperity and defending our security. Our foreign policy, in this sense, is a means to achieve those twin ends.
The other point is this. The effectiveness of our diplomatic efforts is closely related to the level of resources committed to supporting them. While we are acutely aware that it is the taxpayer to whom we are responsible for every spending choice made, we also think, during this tumultuous time, the public has never been more supportive of our efforts to bolster the country’s economic growth and boost its security.
Foreign policy helps achieve both, so we undertook an exercise which compared our diplomatic footprint to countries with like-GDP or a like-population. The Nordic countries, and countries like Ireland and Croatia have invested more in diplomacy and are more economically successful than New Zealand as a result.
They are also more secure because they can afford to sustain strong spending to grow their defence capabilities. Enduringly robust defence spending not only strengthens a country’s foreign policy effectiveness, as we learned between 2017-20, but it gives heft to that country’s voice on the international stage. Singapore is a prime example of a small state whose voice is widely respected and whose voice is given strength by its robust defence spending.
Our voice is not strong. We fight our budget corner hard, but until future New Zealand governments – whoever leads them – see defence and foreign policies not as a cost, but as a driver for making New Zealanders richer and more secure, a highly active diplomacy will be needed to compensate for the lack of resources. It’s an absolute necessity while we play budget catch-up.
In our case that has meant taking 235 flights since taking office. Not to chalk up visits to foreign capitals, as one churlish senior reporter wrote, but to listen, ask good questions, learn from our counterparts, search for ways to build closer relations with them, express New Zealand values and perspectives, and work hard to advance our interests.
More seriously, knowing one’s constraints and strengths and weaknesses also brings a certain forensic quality to choices about where to optimally focus our diplomatic efforts and resources. The Foreign Policy Reset spelt those priorities out.
We have made excellent progress across all six foreign policy priorities. There have also been a couple of relationship ripples we successfully overcame, and as always, multiple international crises that demanded our urgent attention and response.
It’s fair to say New Zealand and its people have suffered more disruption and uncertainty originating from forces and events outside our shores this term than either they or we would wish. It has not been an easy term.
So, it’s a difficult world for a small state like New Zealand to navigate. But, despite these challenges, we think it is also fitting and proper to celebrate successes when they occur. For our foreign policy team, one success that stands out for us is the rapid progress New Zealand has made in forging closer relations across Asia, most especially our priority focus on uplifting our relationships in South-East Asia and India.
Asia Matters to New Zealand’s Prosperity & Security
In some respects, we are living in the Asian century: what happens in the great Asian landmass matters hugely for the trajectory of world affairs. Asia is home to most of the world’s people and half of its economic output. There is absolutely no doubt that Asia is integral to New Zealand’s prosperity and security.
The Government’s foreign policy this term has put a huge emphasis on Asia. As Foreign Minister this term, We have made bilateral visits to 16 Asian countries: nine of the 11 ASEAN member countries; China, Japan, Mongolia and South Korea in North Asia; and India, Nepal and Sri Lanka in South Asia. In the cases of Mongolia and Nepal, we were the first New Zealand Foreign Minister to visit there.
More generally, this New Zealand Government has conducted over 80 Ministerial or Prime Ministerial visits to Asia in this Parliamentary term alone. We have also hosted numerous Asian leaders and Foreign Ministers here in New Zealand. Just this coming week, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister is here in Wellington, opening its new High Commission here.
Overall, this is an unprecedented but necessary level of political commitment by the New Zealand Government in our Asian relationships. These myriad conversations, with all sub-regions of Asia, is a demonstration of where we think New Zealand’s future lies.
Our uplift in Asia is about both harnessing economic opportunity and safeguarding our national security. Indeed, greater security engagement with the region is essential because New Zealand’s security is fundamentally intertwined with stability and peace in Asia. Our priority security interests include:
Maritime Security and Freedom of Navigation, including in the South China Sea;
Peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait;
Transnational Organised Crime, including People Smuggling and Drug Trafficking;
Counter terrorism and counter radicalisation, and;
Disaster resilience and humanitarian aid
We have signed over 20 significant agreements with Asia this term, including upgrading relationships with ASEAN, Singapore, Viet Nam and the Republic of Korea to Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships. Let me offer some brief examples of the progress we have made.
With China, we have a mature relationship and one where we have worked hard through intensive political-level engagement in both Beijing and Wellington to improve our mutual understanding to increase joint economic opportunity while always seeking to grow mutual trust.
With Japan, we are longstanding partners working across a wide range of issues critical to our interests in the region and globally.
With South Korea, New Zealand has signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This elevation of our relationship reflects sustained engagement over several years and a commitment to work together to keep broadening and deepening the scope of our partnership.
With India, New Zealand has sought to deliver closer and broader-based relations.
With ASEAN, we signed last year a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which is an example of our standing on the shoulders of those far-sighted politicians and diplomats who saw its potential, starting New Zealand’s investment in ASEAN 50 years ago.
With Singapore, a great friend of New Zealand, we elevated our relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, deepening our already excellent bilateral relationship across a broad range of sectors, including supply chains and connectivity.
With Viet Nam, we have also concluded a Comprehensive Partnership.
As we said at the start, it is a more contested, fragmented and volatile world, one where strong relationships matter and require more attention with more vigour. This Government’s Foreign Policy Reset has delivered greater focus on and attention to our key strategic partnerships in Asia. That will remain the case – to deliver tangible benefits for both NZ and our partners. NZ’s prosperity and security are intertwined with Asia’s; we cannot afford to do anything less than engage with urgency, purpose, commitment and tenacity.
Last Thoughts
The last 80 years of relative peace and prosperity has given way to a significant global disruption, characterized by the three shifts recognized by Cabinet in early 2024.
In New Zealand’s National Statement to the United Nations later that year, we said ‘There must never be another San Francisco Conference picking up the pieces after another decent into global annihilation and human suffering’.
Back then Prime Minister Peter Fraser knew the proposed UN Charter was imperfect and fought vigorously against the veto. We carry that position forward, because New Zealand strongly supports efforts to reform the veto. It is the one institutional reform that would make the most difference to the effectiveness of the UN.
We also said in our National Statement at the United Nations in 2024 that ‘Those who share our values, and even those who do not, gain from understanding each other’s point of view, even when we cannot agree. From understanding comes opportunity and from diplomacy comes compromise, the building blocks of better relations between nations. We need more diplomacy, more engagement, more compromise.’
To an acute degree, this premise is under assault. But that assault is being met with an urgent response as new diplomatic connections are being forged and existing ones strengthened.
Why? Because one unintended consequence of the shift from rules to power is that middle and small states feel more inter-connected than ever before. That has been palpable wherever we’ve travelled, the realization that events in one region impact people and governments in another.
An example. When invited to the Nordic Council meeting last year one of the Nordic Foreign Ministers told us how appreciative they were of our strong support for Ukraine.
We were told that when they next had to publicly defend their country’s commitment to supporting Ukraine to their own weary citizens they would cite the case of New Zealand, the furthest country from the Russia’s illegal war, but a strong supporter of Ukraine because of the vital principles being defended there.
It is the many moments like that when bonds between countries are forged and strengthened. The mutual recognition of shared values brings mutual respect, enhancing each country’s reputation in the eyes of the other. It is also what we call, simply, diplomacy.
But in the current media environment, with 24/7 demands from activists and critics for us to express the government’s outrage on the ravages of every passing moment, the signal of our foreign policy efforts often get lost in the noise.
What is that signal? When coming into office, we immediately recognized that in foreign policy terms we were behind the curve. We quickly took stock of the global situation, its direction of travel, and our domestic constraints.
We then analysed the shifts occurring, assessed our strengths and weaknesses against what could be achieved, then fashioned a strategy to advance or defend our foreign policy interests across six priority areas.
As realists, New Zealand’s foreign policy is driven by prudence. As realists, we have also conducted a highly active foreign policy. The times demanded it. If our national voice has not always been to everyone’s liking, or been loud enough for them, then perhaps it is because we are still trying to rebuild its strength, and in our judgement there is much more to do.
The success of our Asia uplift is positive reinforcement that our strategy is working. It is only a start, but in Asia we have helped build on a foundation forged by earlier generations of New Zealand politicians, public servants, academics, and educators. It is truly a collective success.
Let us end by saying to you that our foreign policy has been “hiding in plain sight”, for there is a saying in the Library of Congress, ‘Words are a kind of action, and actions are a kind of words’.
New Zealand’s foreign policy values and principles are in our speeches, our words. They are also in our actions, our highly active diplomacy.
We continue to believe that through our diplomatic engagement with other countries we are building foundations for when the order-shattering disruption subsides. Then, when we have global leadership of a different character, discussions on how to repair and reinvigorate the rules-based order will bear fruit.
Thank you
Original source: https://nz.mil-osi.com/2026/05/20/asia-in-transition-the-middle-power-moment/